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Abstract
In an all-pay auction, only one bidder wins but all bidders must pay the auctioneer. All-pay
bidding games arise from attaching a similar bidding structure to traditional combinatorial games
to determine which player moves next. In contrast to the established theory of single-pay bidding
games, optimal play involves choosing bids from some probability distribution that will guarantee
a minimum probability of winning. In this manner, all-pay bidding games wed the underlying
concepts of economic and combinatorial games. We present several results on the structures of
optimal strategies in these games. We then give a fast algorithm for computing such strategies for
a large class of all-pay bidding games. The methods presented provide a framework for further
development of the theory of all-pay bidding games.
1 Introduction
At the conclusion of an all-pay auction, all bidders must pay the bids they submitted, with only the
highest bidder receiving the item. With this idea in mind, one can play a variant of a two-player game
using an all-pay auction to decide who moves next instead of simply alternating between players. For
example, one could play all-pay Tic-Tac-Toe with 100 chips. Each round both players privately record
their bids and then simultaneously reveal them. If player A bids 40 and his opponent bids 25, player A
would get to choose a square to mark and the next round of bidding would begin wih player A having
85 chips, player B having 115 chips. Note that the chips have no value outside the game and only serve
to determine who moves - the ultimate goal is still just to get three-in-a-row.
Another variant of the game could have only the player who wins the move pay his/her bid, i.e.
deciding who moves next using a first-price auction. These games were first studied formally in the
1980s by Richman, whose work has since then been greatly expanded upon. Intuitively, there is less
risk in these “Richman games” for the player losing the bid. If your opponent bids 100 for a certain
move, it makes no difference whether your bid was 99 or 0. All that matters is that your opponent’s
bid was higher. A surprising consequence of this single-pay structure is that for every state of a game,
there exists a “Richman value” v for each player that represents the proportion of the total chips that
player would need to hold to have a deterministic winning strategy. In this situation, the player with the
winning strategy can tell her opponent what bid she will be making next without affecting her ability to
ultimately win. For zero-sum games, this means that unless a player’s chip ratio is exactly v, then one
of the players must have such a winning strategy [1], [2].
Our objective is to begin the formal study of all-pay bidding games. Returning to the above example
where your opponent bids 100 chips and you are indifferent between bidding 99 and 0, it is clear this
is no longer true for an all-pay bidding mechanism. You would be very disappointed had you bid 99,
as your opponent would be paying just 1 chip on net to make a move. Had you bid 0, though, you
might feel pretty good about not moving this current turn, as the 100 extra chips may make a bigger
difference for the rest of the game. Thus, there are at least two bidding scenarios which intuitively
seem like very good positions to be in: winning the bid by a relatively small number of chips or losing
the bid by a relatively large number of chips. This behavior suggests that, unlike in Richman games,
in all-pay bidding games one of the players will not necessarily have a deterministic winning strategy.
Instead, players must randomize their bidding in some way. Thus, we must appeal to the concept of
mixed bidding strategies in Nash equilibria.
1.1 A Game of All-Pay Bidding Tic Tac Toe
Before presenting formal definitions and results, we provide a sample all-pay bidding game to illustrate
some of the main features of playing these games. Alice and Bob, each with 100 chips, are playing all-pay
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bidding Tic-Tac-Toe. Each turn Alice and Bob secretly write down a bid, a whole number less than or
equal to their total number of chips. They then reveal their bids and whoever bid more gets to decide
who makes the next move. We say a player has advantage if, when players bid the same amount, that
player gets to decide who makes the next move. The question of deciding how to assign advantage is
one we encountered early on. For our games, we give advantage to the player with more chips, then
arbitrarily let Alice have advantage when Alice and Bob have the same number of chips. A number of
other mechanisms would also suffice, such as alternating advantage or having a special “tie-breaking”
chip that grants advantage and is passed each time it is used. Our choice was made in the interest of
computational simplicity and to eventually allow extension to real-valued bidding.
First Move. Both players have 100 chips. Alice bids 25, Bob bids 40. Bob wins the right to move
and plays in the center of the board.
Second Move. Alice has 115 chips, Bob has 85 chips. Alice wants to win this move to keep pace with
Bob, but also does not see why it should be worth more than the first, so she only slightly increases her
bid to 30. Bob, thinking that Alice may want to win this move more, is content to let Alice win and
collect chips by bidding 0. Alice wins the right to move and plays in the top-left corner of the board.
Third Move. Alice has 85 chips, Bob has 115 chips. Alice bids 45, Bob bids 40, so Alice wins the
right to move and plays in the top-center of the board.
Fourth Move. Alice has 80 chips, Bob has 120 chips. Alice is one move away from winning and
decides to risk it and bid all of her 80 chips. Unfortunately for her, Bob has guessed her move and has
himself bid 80 as well. Because Bob has more chips overall, he uses his advantage to win the tie and
plays in the top-right corner of the board, blocking Alice’s victory and setting himself up for one.
Fifth Move. Alice has 80 chips, Bob has 120 chips. Bob has more chips and is just a move away from
winning, so he can bid everything, play in the bottom-left corner and win the game.
In normal Tic-Tac-Toe, both players can guarantee a draw by playing well, but as we see from this
example, the result of a game of all-pay Tic-Tac-Toe involves far more chance.
For example, at the fourth move in the above game, Alice could have guessed Bob might bid 80 and
chosen to “duck” by bidding 0. In this case Bob would win the move and play as before, but now the
chip counts would be 160 to 40 in Alice’s favor, and Alice can bid 40 and then 80 to win the next two
moves and win in the left column. It is easy to see that if a player knows what his opponent will bid
at each move, he can win the game easily. Thus, in the vast majority of all-pay bidding games, optimal
play cannot be deterministic.
Though we do not return to Tic-Tac-Toe in this paper, it served as a test game for much of our
research. Using our results, we built a computer program to play all-pay bidding Tic-Tac-Toe optimally.
The program can be played against at http://biddingttt.herokuapp.com. The theory behind this
program, which is not specific to Tic-Tac-Toe, will be the focus of the rest of the paper.
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1.2 Overview of Results
Our ultimate goal is to characterize the optimal strategies for a general class of all-pay bidding games.
The game consists of iterations of both players bidding for the right to move followed by one of the
players making a move. In turn, an optimal strategy will also have two parts: the bid strategy and the
move strategy. For a given position in the game (e.g. a configuration of the Tic-Tac-Toe board) and chip
counts for each of the players (e.g. Alice has 115 chips, Bob has 85 chips), the bid strategy must tell
players how to best randomize their bets (e.g. Alice bids 0 chips half the time, 80 chips half the time)
while the move strategy must tell whoever wins the bid the best move to make (e.g. where to play on
the Tic-Tac-Toe board).
The problem of determining move strategy is largely combinatorial in nature and remains similar to
its analog in Richman games. We can still represent the space of game states as a directed graph, and
there is a not always a single best move that each player can make upon winning the bid. That is, the
best move could also depend on each player’s chip counts moving forward.
The focus of our work, then, will be on determining the optimal bidding strategy for any game
position and chip counts. Naturally, this should depend on a player’s chances of winning in any of the
possible subsequent game situations (i.e. after a single move and updated chip counts). For purposes
of initial analysis, we will assume that these future winning probabilities are known, and see how the
bidding strategy can be determined from this information. Then, by using the recursive nature of the
directed graph, we will be able to start from the “win” and “loss” nodes (where the probability is just
1 or 0) to find the optimal bidding strategies and winning probabilities for any game situation. For the
rest of this paper, we will often refer to a bidding strategy as just a “strategy” when it is clear that the
focus is just on the bidding side of the game. Here, a strategy will be a probability vector where the
ith coordinate corresponds to the probability a player will bid i chips. Further, a Nash equilibrium for
a game situation will just be a pair of strategies so that neither player has an incentive to deviate. This
means that each player’s strategy will maximize his/her minimum probability of ultimately winning from
the next turn of the game.
It quickly becomes apparent that a naive recursive algorithm using linear programming is feasible
only for games with very few moves. Thus, in the interest of being able to practically calculate the
optimal bidding strategies for general games, we prove some structural results on the Nash equilibria. In
particular, useful structure arises when we study a particular class of games that we dubbed “precise”,
which roughly speaking are games where having one more chip is strictly better than not. The key result
is a surprising relationship between opposing optimal strategies that allows one to immediately write a
Nash equilibrium strategy for the player without advantage if given a Nash equilibrium strategy for the
player with advantage.
This relationship, (2.3), which we call the Reverse Theorem, is a critical step toward the calculation
of optimal strategies for precise games. Further, by assigning an arbitrarily small value in the game to
each chip, we get a precise game that is very similar to the original game. We show that the optimal
strategies we can calculate for these new precise games will indeed converge to optimal strategies for our
possibly imprecise games. Our theoretical results ultimately culminate in a fast algorithm for computing
optimal probabilistic bidding strategies. Together with a move strategy for the combinatorial side of the
game, this gives a complete characterization of optimal play for all-pay bidding games.
2 Strategies in precise games
Let Ga,b denote a single turn of a two-player all-pay bidding game G where player A is endowed with
a chips and player B is endowed with b chips. The underlying combinatorial game G is a two-player
zero-sum game, represented by an acyclic, colored, directed graph with two marked vertices, A and B.
The game begins by placing a token at some starting vertex. At each turn, a player moves the token to an
adjacent vertex. Player A wins if the token reaches A and player B wins if the token reaches B. By saying
the graph is colored, this means that edges are one of two colors, say red and blue, such that A can only
move the token along red edges and B can only move the token along blue edges. To ensure consistency
in the bidding strategy from turn to turn, we seek to avoid situations where the winner of a bid can be
put in zugzwang - i.e. where it would be better to not move at all. Thus, the bid winning player, rather
than simply being able to move next, gets to determine who moves next. With this condition, G can an
asymmetric game where zugzwang is possible, like chess and many other popular two player games.
The payoff, or value of the game, for player A at Ga,b is denoted by vA(Ga,b) ∈ [0, 1] and is equal
to the probability that player A wins the game under optimal play. That is, we set vA(A) = 1 and
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vA(B) = 0 and calculate payoffs recursively. Similarly, let vB(Ga,b) denote the probability that player
B wins the game. Often, when the chip counts or specific combinatorial game are not relevant to the
discussion, the payoffs will be shortened to vA and vB . Note that vB = 1− vA as we only study games
that cannot end in ties (for the game of Tic-Tac-Toe above, we can arbitrarily let one of the players win
all draws).
Thus a payoff matrix for player A in Ga,b is denoted by MA(Ga,b) and is given by
(MA)i,j =
{
max(maxG′∈SA(G) vA(G
′
a−j+i,b−i+j),minG′∈SB(G) vA(G
′
a−j+i,b−i+j)) if A wins the bid
min(minG′∈SB(G) vA(G
′
a−j+i,b−i+j),maxG′∈SA(G) vA(G
′
a−j+i,b−i+j)) if B wins the bid
where SA(G) and SB are the set of game positions that can be moved to from G by A and B respectively.
The (i, j) entry corresponds to player A’s probability of winning the game after A bids j and B bids
i. Note this is well-defined because the game is zero-sum: by moving to the game state that minimizes
Player A’s payoff, player B is maximizing his own payoff at the same time (and vice-versa). Similarly,
let MB(Ga,b) denote the payoff matrix for player B.
We notice that if player A bids x and player B bids y, this is equivalent to player A bidding x+z and
player B bidding y + z for any z because the players are paying each other. Thus, we have that payoff
matrices are Toeplitz, or diagonal-constant. We will write player A’s and player B’s payoff matrices for
Ga,b as 
α0 α1 . . . αa
α−1 α0 . . . αa−1
...
...
...
...
α−b α−b+1 . . . α−b+a
 and

β0 β1 . . . βb
β−1 β0 . . . βb−1
...
...
...
...
β−a β−a+1 . . . β−a+b

respectively.
We pause to consider a simple example. Let the underlying game be one where player A needs to
make two moves to win, while player B needs to make only one more move to win. Suppose player A
has 5 chips while player B has 3 chips. Then we would get the following payoff matrices for player A
and player B 
1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 1
 and

0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0

respectively
A strategy for player A in Ga,b is given by an (a + 1)-dimensional column vector with all non-
negative entries that sum to 1. The i-th entry of this vector (where we start indexing at 0) gives the
probability that player A will bid i chips. Similarly, a strategy for player B in Ga,b and is given by a
(b+1)-dimensional column vector satisfying the same conditions. We denote a Nash equilibrium strategy
in the game Ga,b as SA(Ga,b) for player A and as SB(Ga,b) for player B. Often times we will not be too
explicit with the size of these vectors. It should be clear from context.
Note that the ith row of MA corresponds to the payoffs of each of A’s pure strategies if her opponent
B bids i. Letting Ai be the ith row of MA, we have Ai · SA = ai0(SA)0 + · · · + aia(SA)a = (PA)i, a
weighted average of A’s pure payoffs when B bids i. Thus, (PA)i is player A’s probability of winning if
her strategy is SA and her opponent purely bids i. For example, if we have
MA · SA =
(
1 12
0 1
)
·
(
1
2
1
2
)
=
(
3
4
1
2
)
,
this means by playing SA, player A wins
3
4 of the time if player B only bids 0 and wins
1
2 of the time if
player B only bids 1.
Now, if player B’s strategy is SB , S
T
BMASA = (SB)0(PA)0 + · · · + (SB)b(PA)b, another weighted
average of A’s payoffs for each of B’s pure strategies. Thus, STBMASA is exactly A’s payoff if she plays
SA and her opponent plays SB . S
T
AMBSB is B’s payoff in the same situation. Continuing with the above
example, if we now let STB =
(
1
2
1
2
)
then STBMASA =
1
2 · 34 + 12 · 12 = 58 . So given strategies SA and
SB for players A and B, player A has a
5
8 probability of winning.
We compile these results in the lemma below.
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Lemma 2.1. Let MA and MB be payoff matrices for players A and B, respectively, in Ga,b. Then the
following statements are true.
(a) The diagonals of MA and MB are constant, i.e. the payoff matrices are Toeplitz.
(b) Let 1 be the appropriately sized matrix whose entries are all 1. Then MB = 1−MTA .
(c) Suppose (SA, SB) is a Nash equilibrium. Then (MBSB)i = vB if (SA)i 6= 0 and (MASA)i = vA if
(SB)i 6= 0.
This lemma provides the basic structure from which many of our main proofs will follow from later.
It is clear that vA(Ga+1,b) ≥ vA(Ga,b), since player A can always bid as if he did not have the extra
chip. We now define a class of games pivotal to our analysis in which this inequality is strict. Formally,
a game G is called precise if in every successor state to G, it is strictly better to have one more chip.
Remark 1. We note that in particular, this guarantees a certain strict monotonicity among the entries
of the payoff matrices. In particular, winning the bid by one less chip is always strictly preferable, as is
losing by one more chip. Thus we have that for the player with advantage, αi > αj for 0 ≤ i < j and
αi > αj for i < j < 0. A similar relationship holds for the player without advantage, except β0 < β1 and
β0 > β−1.
Definition. A strategy S has length ` = `(S) if S`−1 6= 0 and Sm = 0 ∀m ≥ `. A strategy S is
gap-free if Si, Sj 6= 0 if and only if Sk 6= 0 ∀i ≤ k ≤ j.
The definition of length encapsulates the observation that unless the game is close to completion,
players will never bid a large proportion of their chips. The second definition seems more arbitrary at
the moment, but it plays a pivotal role in the following Proposition and will serve to greatly simplify the
language throughout the paper.
Proposition 2.2. Let Ga,b be precise. Any equilibrium strategy for the player with advantage is gap-free
and bids 0 with nonzero probability, while any equilibrium strategy for the other player is gap-free and
bids 1 with nonzero probability. If the player with advantage has an equilibrium strategy of length `, any
equilibrium strategy for the other player has length ` or `+ 1.
Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that player A has advantage, and let SA = (s0, . . . , sa) and
SB = (t0, . . . , tb) be equilibrium strategies for players A and B respectively. We claim that if i ≥ 0,
(i) si = 0 implies ti+1 = 0, and
(ii) ti+1 = 0 implies si+1 = 0.
If si = 0 and ti+1 > 0, player B should alter his strategy so that he bids i with probability ti + ti+1 and
i+ 1 with probability 0. This saves player B a chip whenever he would have bid i+ 1 without changing
any possible outcome of these bids, and all other possibilities are unchanged. By precision, this new
strategy is strictly better than SB for player B, a contradiction. This proves (i).
If ti = 0 and si > 0, player A should alter her strategy so that she bids i with probability si + si+1
and i+ 1 with probability 0. As in the previous case this new strategy is strictly better for player A, a
contradiction, proving (ii).
Together, (i) and (ii) complete the proof except in the case when SB = (1, 0, . . . , 0). However, in this
case an optimal strategy for player A is to also bid 0 with probability 1, and it follows that Ga,b is not
precise.
This characterization of equilibrium strategies is what motivated our restriction to precise games.
In the presence of precision, an easily observable, yet highly unexpected relationship between opposing
optimal strategies appears. This relationship forms the foundation for the rest of our results.
Definition. The reverse of a length ` strategy S is given by
R(S) = R((s0, s1, . . . , s`−1, 0, . . . , 0)) = (s`−1, s`−2, . . . , s0, 0, . . . , 0).
where the number of trailing zeroes will be clear from context.
Theorem 2.3. Suppose that Ga,b is precise, and that S is an equilibrium strategy for the player with
advantage. Then R(S) is an equilibrium strategy for the player without advantage.
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Proof. Suppose without loss of generality that playerA has advantage, and S = SA = (s0, . . . , s`−1, 0, . . . , 0)
has length `. By Lemma 2.1 and Proposition 2.2, we have
MA · SA =

α0 α1 . . . αa
α−1 α0 . . . αa−1
...
...
...
α−b α1−b . . . αa−b


s0
s1
...
s`−1
0
...
0

=

w0
vA
...
vA
w`
...
wb

, (2)
where w0, w`, . . . , wb ≥ vA. We claim further that w0 = vA.
Suppose for a contradiction that w0 > vA. Then if SB is an equilibrium strategy for player B, by
Lemma 2.1 and Proposition 2.2 it is of the form SB = (0, t1, t2, . . . , t`, 0, . . . , 0) where t1 > 0, but possibly
t` = 0.
When played against SA, SB gives a payoff of vB . Let v
′
B be player B’s payoff against SA when he
plays the shifted strategy S′B = (t1, t2, . . . , t`, 0, . . . , 0). Since (SA, SB) is a Nash equilibrium, v
′
B ≤ vB .
On the other hand, player A can guarantee a payoff of 1 − v′B against SB by using the strategy S′A =
(0, s0, s1, . . . , s`−2, s`−1, . . . , 0) since the probability of any given difference in bids occurring is the same
in (S′A, SB) as in (SA, S
′
B). Therefore v
′
B ≥ vB , so vB = v′B , whence STB ·MA · SA = S′TB ·MA · SA.
Expanding this, we find
0 · w0 + t1 · vA + · · ·+ t`−1 · vA + t` · w` = t1 · w0 + t2 · vA + · · ·+ t` · vA
Suppose w` > vA. Then, we must have t` = 0, which solves to get w0 = vA. If w` = vA, the equation
solves the same way to get w0 = vA. Thus, either way we have a contradiction of w0 > vA. Thus,
w0 = vA. Together with (2), this gives
vA = α0s0 + · · ·+ α`−1s`−1 = · · · = α−(`−1)s0 + · · ·+ α0s`−1. (3)
By Lemma 2.1 we have MB = 1−MTA , so
MB · R(SA) =

1− α0 1− α−1 . . . 1− α−b
1− α1 1− α0 . . . 1− α1−b
...
...
...
1− αa 1− αa−1 . . . 1− αa−b


s`−1
...
s0
0
...
0

.
For 0 ≤ i ≤ `−1 we have (1−αi)s`−1+· · ·+(1−αi−`+1)s0 = (s0+· · ·+s`−1)−(αi−`+1s0+· · ·+αis`−1) =
1 − vA = vB by equation (3). In other words, R(SA) guarantees player B his highest possible payoff
against SA, so he has no incentive to deviate from R(SA) if player A uses SA.
We now show player A has no incentive to deviate from SA against R(SA). If ` ≤ i ≤ a, the payoff
for player B if player A bids i will be (s0 + · · ·+ s`−1)− (αi−`+1s0 + · · ·+ αis`−1). By the formulation
of precision in terms of payoff matrices in Remark 1, we have strict inequalities αi−`+1 < α0 through
αi < α`−1, so αi−`+1s0 + · · · + αis`−1 < α0s0 + · · · + α`−1s`−1 = vA. Thus player A loses utility if she
bids any amount greater than `− 1 with positive probability. One also readily sees that if she alters her
distribution of bids 0, . . . , `−1 this will not change her payoff against R(SA). It follows that (SA,R(SA))
is a Nash equilibrium as claimed.
The Reverse Theorem reveals a strong relationship between opposing player’s strategies. Using it,
we can now fully characterize the set of optimal strategies for both players in precise games.
Theorem 2.4. If Ga,b is precise, the player with advantage has a unique equilibrium strategy.
Proof. Let player A have advantage. Suppose that SA and S
′
A are distinct equilibrium strategies for
player A. Let SA and S
′
A have lengths ` and `
′ respectively. By the Reverse Theorem, player B has
strategies R(SA) and R(S′A) which have lengths ` and `′ respectively. Suppose `′ 6= `. Assume, without
loss of generality, that `′ > `. Then R(S′A) is a Nash equilibrium strategy for B with length greater than
SA which contradicts Propostion 2.2. Thus, ` = `
′.
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Assume, without loss of generality, that (MASA)` ≥ (MAS′A)`. That is, we assume, that if B bids `
against SA he will do no better than if he were bidding ` against S
′
A. It is possible he will do strictly worse
as bidding ` is not necessarily a part of player B’s optimal strategy. Consider the following function:
S(x) = S′A + x(SA − S′A)
We claim that for any x for which S(x) is a valid strategy, S(x) is an optimal strategy. Note that S(x)
has entrywise sum of 1 so S(x) is at least valid for x ∈ [0, 1]. Consider:
(MAS(x))i = (MAS
′
A)i + x(MASA −MAS′A)i
For i < `, (MAS
′
A)i = (MASA)i = vA so (MAS(x))i = vA. For i = `, (MASA)i ≥ (MAS′A)i so
(MAS(x))i ≥ (MAS′A)i ≥ vA. If player B bids anything greater than ` then he will do strictly worse
than if he bid `, because he will win by more than he would by bidding `. Therefore, S(x) guarantees
player A a payoff of at least vA. Choose the maximal x
? for which S(x?) is valid. Because S(x) has
entrywise sum of 1, it is only invalid if S(x) has a negative entry. Thus, at this maximal S(x?) has at
least one zero entry. Either S(x?) has length less than `, a 0 in its first entry, or is not gap-free. Each of
these is impossible (above, Prop 2.2). Therefore distinct optimal strategies SA and S
′
A cannot exist.
In most precise games, both players have unique optimal strategies. It is possible, however, to
construct a game in which the player without advantage has multiple optimal strategies. We give a
characterization of these as well. If S is a strategy let (0, S) represent a new strategy where anytime one
would bid i in S he will bid i+ 1 in (0, S).
Theorem 2.5. Let Ga,b be precise and let player A have advantage. The following statements hold:
(1) Player B has a unique strategy of minimal length. This strategy is R(SA).
(2) If Player B has more than one optimal strategy, then another optimal strategy is of the form
(0,R(SA)).
(3) All other optimal strategies for player B are of the form
tR(SA) + (1− t)(0,R(SA)) t ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Throughout this proof we will use a method from the proof of Theorem 2.4. Suppose we have
two strategies P and T such that wherever P is non-zero so is T . Then we define
E(x) = T + (P − T )x
We showed above that E(x) gives an optimal strategy as long as it is valid. If we choose x∗ to be maximal
so that E(x∗) is valid, then E(x∗) gives an optimal strategy with a 0 in some spot where S was nonzero.
Let us call the strategy produced by this method E(P, T ).
We begin with (1). By the Reverse Theorem, player B has a strategy R(SA) which is of the same
length as SA. By Proposition 2.2, player B cannot have a strategy shorter than SA. Therefore, R(SA)
is a strategy of minimal length for player B. Suppose S is another strategy of minimal length for player
B. Then S∗ = E(S,R(SA)) is either of lesser length, is not gap-free, or has a 0 in the first entry. The
first two possibilites are impossible by Proposition 2.2. In the third case, we can apply the same method
again to get E(S, S∗) which is either of lesser length, not gap free, or has 0’s in the first two entries.
Each of these is impossible by Proposition 2.2.
We now proceed to (2). Suppose player B has more than one optimal strategy. Then by (1) it must
be of length greater than R(SA). Let ` be the length of R(SA). By Proposition 2.2, any other optimal
strategy of player B must be of length ` + 1. Let S be such a strategy. Suppose S0 6= 0. Then we can
take S′ = E(R(SA), S) which must have a 0 in the first coordinate lest we contradict Proposition 2.2.
We must show that S′ = (0,R(SA)). Because MB is Toeplitz,
(MB · (0,R(SA)))i+1 = (MB · R(SA))i
Therefore (0,R(SA)) guarantees player B at least his optimal payoff unless player A plays 0. Suppose
that if player A bids 0 then (0,R(SA)) gives player B a payoff of v less than his optimal payoff of vB .
Then define a strategy,
S4 =
S′ − c(0,R(SA))
1− c
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for c sufficiently small so that S′ − c(0,R(SA)) has all positive entries. Then S4 is a valid strategy that
guarantees player B his optimal payoff if player A bids anything from 1 to `+ 1. It guarantees player B
more than his optimal payoff if player A bids 0 as:(
MB · S
′ − c(0,R(SA))
1− c
)
0
=
1
1− c · (vB − cv) >
1
1− c · (vB − cvB) = vB
S4 is a strictly better strategy than S′ as player A always bids 0 with nonzero probability. S′ is optimal
so this is impossible. Thus, (0,R(SA)) is an optimal strategy. That it is equal to S′ will follow from (3).
Finally we prove (3). R(SA) and (0,R(SA)) are optimal strategies so any convex combination of the
two is optimal. Let S? be an optimal strategy for player B that is not a convex combination of the two.
Then, S? must be of length `+ 1. Therefore we can take E((0,R(SA)), S?). This gives a strategy which
is either of length `, is not gap-free, or has multiple 0’s at the begining. The latter two possibilities are
impossible by Proposition 2.2. R(SA) is the unique optimal strategy of length ` so:
R(SA) = (0,R(SA)) + x(S? − (0,R(SA)))
1
x
R(SA) + (x− 1)
x
(0,R(SA)) = S?
Note that 1x +
(x−1)
x = 1 and both coefficients must be postive or else the first or last entry of S
? will be
negative. Thus, S? is a convex combination of R(SA) and (0,R(SA)).
3 Imprecise Games
3.1 Adjustments for Precision
In most of the above proofs we assume that Ga,b is a precise game. In many games with small associated
graphs, this is not the case. The simplest example is a game where in the associated graph the only
directed edge goes to A. Then player A always wins, so the chip counts do no matter whatsoever. Thus,
we apply a small adjustment to the payoff matrices for players A and B. Pick a small x > 0. We now
define MxA(Ga,b) as
MxA(Ga,b) = MA(Ga,b) + xBa,b
where Ba,b is given by the (b+ 1)× (a+ 1) Toeplitz matrix
a a− 1 · · · 0
a+ 1 a · · · 1
...
...
. . .
...
a+ b a+ b− 1 · · · b
 .
Intuitively, we can think of xBa,b as a payoff matrix that gives payoff x for each chip a player has at the
end of a turn. SxA(Ga,b) is then given by the strategy that maximizes player A’s minimum payoff under
MxA(Ga,b). v
x
A(Ga,b) is this payoff.
While the payoff no longer corresponds exactly to winning probability, the game Gxa,b is still zero-sum,
with total utility 1 + (a + b)x split between the two players. We generalize our Lemma 2.1 to this new
game:
Lemma 3.1. The game represented by MxA(Ga,b) is precise.
Proof. Each entry of MxA(Ga,b) represents a successor state of the game where each player has some
number of chips. From the way we have defined Ba,b, for any successor state in which having one
more chip provided an equal payoff in Ga,b, having one more chip will now provide a payoff exactly x
greater.
A natural question arising from this adjustment is whether or not it gives a good approximation of
the actual payoff for Ga,b and the actual Nash equilibria. The following theorem shows that by choosing
a small enough x, MxA, v
x
A, and S
x
A can be made arbitarily close to MA, vA and some Nash equilbrium
strategy SA.
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Theorem 3.2. With SA as described above,
lim
x→0
MxA(Ga,b) = MA(Ga,b), (1)
lim
x→0
vxA(Ga,b) = vA(Ga,b), (2)
lim
x→0
SxA(Ga,b) = SA(Ga,b). (3)
Proof of (1) and (2). We notice that (1) follows directly from the definition of MxA:
lim
x→0
MxA(Ga,b) = lim
x→0
(MA(Ga,b) + xBa,b) = MA(Ga,b)
We now consider (2). We can define three functions:
vxA(Ga,b) = min
i
(MxA(Ga,b) · SxA(Ga,b))i = g(x)
vxA(Ga,b) = min
i
(MxA(Ga,b) · SxA(Ga,b))i
= min
i
(MA(Ga,b) · SxA(Ga,b) + xB · SxA(Ga,b))i
≤ min
i
(MA(Ga,b) · SxA(Ga,b))i + max
i
(xB · SxA(Ga,b))i
≤ min
i
(MA(Ga,b) · SA(Ga,b))i + max
i
(xB · 1)i
= vA(Ga,b) + max
i
(xB · 1)i = h(x)
vxA(Ga,b) = min
i
(MxA(Ga,b) · SxA(Ga,b))i
≥ min
i
(MxA(Ga,b) · SA(Ga,b))i = f(x)
Notice that for all x ≥ 0, f(x) ≤ g(x) ≤ h(x). We also see that
lim
x→0
f(x) = lim
x→0
min
i
(MxA(Ga,b) · SA(Ga,b))i = min
i
(MA(Ga,b) · SA(Ga,b))i = vA(Ga,b)
lim
x→0
h(x) = lim
x→0
vA(Ga,b) + max
i
(xB · 1)i = vA(Ga,b) + max
i
(B · 1)i · lim
x→0
x = vA(Ga,b)
Therefore,
lim
x→0
h(x) = lim
x→0
vxA(Ga,b) = vA(Ga,b).
This leaves (3), the proof of which is more nuanced. We must first develop some more theory of
all-pay bidding games.
3.2 Restricted Games
In many bidding games, the random distribution governing optimal play does not involve bidding above
some threshold. In a game of Bidding Tic-Tac-Toe where each player begins with 100 chips, a player
should not bid 100 on the first turn. By the Reverse Theorem, the two players, have optimal strategies
of equal length. Suppose in some bidding game Ga,b, both players have strategies of length `. Then we
can consider the restricted game, Ga,b | `, where both players can bid at most ` − 1 on the first turn
and play returns to normal thereafter. In such a restricted game players are still able to play the length
` optimal strategy they would have employed in the original game. Is this strategy still optimal?
Lemma 3.3. If SA, SB are optimal length ` strategies in Ga,b that provide the payoffs vA and 1 − vA
respectively, then they are optimal in Ga,b | ` and provide the same payoffs.
Proof. MA(Ga,b | `) is the ` × ` top-left minor of MA(Ga,b) as the games are identical after the first
move. Thus, both players bidding less than ` in Ga,b is equivalent to the players making the same bids
in Ga,b | `. Thus, MA(Ga,b | `) · SA gives the first ` entries of MA(Ga,b) · SA. The minimum entry of
MA(Ga,b) · SA is vA so the minimum entry of MA(Ga,b | `) · SA is at least vA. Thus, SA guarantees at
least the payoff vA. Using the same logic for MB(Ga,b | `), we obtain the SB guarantees the payoff at
least 1− vA. The total payoff is exactly 1 so player A gets payoff vA and cannot do better and player B
gets the payoff 1− vA and cannot do better.
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Furthermore, recall that precision is a characteristic of the successor states in a game. The possible
successors of a restricted game are a subset of the successors of the normal game. Thus, if a game
is precise then its restricted game is also precise. We are now able to state a powerful result for the
restricted game that will allow us to prove some important results for general bidding games.
Lemma 3.4. In a precise game Ga,b, if SA, an optimal strategy of minimal length, has length `, then
MA(Ga,b | `) is invertible.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists y ∈ R` such that MA(Ga,b | `) · y = 0. Define
y¯ ∈ Ra by y¯i = yi for 0 ≤ i ≤ `− 1 and y¯i = 0 for i ≥ `. Then MA(Ga,b) · y¯ is a vector with 0 in it first
` entries. In particular, (MA(Ga,b) · y¯)0 = 0. SA has all positive entries so there exists c ∈ R such that
S+ = SA + cy¯ and S− = SA − cy¯ have all positive entries. We note that:
(MA(Ga,b) · S+)i = (MA(Ga,b) · SA)i + (MA(Ga,b) · cy¯)i = vA + 0 = vA
(MA(Ga,b) · S−)i = (MA(Ga,b) · SA)i − (MA(Ga,b) · cy¯)i = vA + 0 = vA
for 0 ≤ i ≤ ` − 1. Suppose the sum of the entries of S+ is less than 1. Then there exists k > 1 such
that the sum of the entries of kS+ is equal to 1. Then kS+ is a valid strategy for player A. that gives
payoff kvA > vA against player B’s first ` pure strategies. Thus, against R(SA), kS+ is better than SA
so (SA,R(SA)) is not a Nash equilibrium. Contradiction. Then suppose the sum of the entries of S+
is greater than 1. Then the sum of the entries of S− is less than 1 so the same argument holds. Then
suppose the the sum of the entries of S+ equals 1. Then S+ and SA are optimal in Ga,b | `. Ga,b | ` is
precise, however, so there exists only one optimal strategy of minimal length for either player in Ga,b | `.
Therefore y must equal 0.
A method for computing optimal strategies for the player with advantage, say player A, now becomes
apparent. Given the length of the player’s unique optimal strategy we can consider the payoff matrix
of the restricted game. By the Reverse Theorem, player B has a gap-free strategy of the same length.
Then the restricted payoff matrix multiplied by player A’s optimal strategy must give a constant vector.
The inverse of our restricted payoff matrix multiplied by some non-zero constant vector will therefore
give a scalar multiple of player A’s optimal strategy.
Theorem 3.5. Let player A have advantage. In a precise game Ga,b if SA has length ` then
SA =
MA(Ga,b | `)−11
1TMA(Ga,b | `)−11
Proof. As discussed above MA(Ga,b | `)−1 · 1 is a scalar multiple of SA. The sum of the entries of
SA is 1 so we need only divide by the sum of the entries of MA(Ga,b | `)−1 · 1. This is given by
1TMA(Ga,b | `)−11.
This theorem gives an explicit and rapid method for computing optimal strategies for a player with
advantage. Combined with the Reverse Theorem, we will be able to develop a method for computing
optimal strategies for both players in any simple bidding game. First, we will return to (3) of Theorem
3.2.
3.3 Convergence of Strategies
Recall our conjecture that as x→ 0, SA(Gxa,b)→ SA(Ga,b). The above theorem gives even more weight
to this claim as together they give a method for approximating optimal strategies for imprecise games
via a convergent sequence of strategies for precise games.
We begin by partially extending the invertibility of the restricted payoff matrix to imprecise games.
The importance of this result is not immediately obvious, but it will be integral to the proof of part (3)
of Theorem 3.2. For simplicity, we will sometimes write MA(Ga,b | `) as MA(`) and MB(Ga,b | `) as
MB(`).
Proposition 3.6. If player A has a length ` optimal strategy for MxA = MA(G
x
a,b) then at least one of
MA(Ga,b | `) and MB(Ga,b | `) = 1−MA(Ga,b | `)T is invertible.
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Proof. For simplicity, let MA = MA(Ga,b | `) and MB = MB(Ga,b | `). If MA is invertible, we are done,
so suppose MA is not invertible. Let w 6= 0 be in the nullspace of MA. Because SxA is gap-free, there
exists c > 0 sufficiently small such that SxA ± cw are valid strategies for player A. Then
MxA · (SxA ± cw) = MxASxA ± (MA + xB) · cw = MxASxA ± cxBw.
Each successive row in B is 1 greater in each entry than the previous row. Suppose that the sum of the
entries of w is equal to 0. Then,
(Bw)i+1 = (Bw)i + (1, . . . , 1) · w = (Bw)i
Thus, Bw is a constant vector. If Bw = 0 then
MxA · w = MAw + xBw = 0.
By Lemma 3.4, MxA is invertible so Bw cannot equal 0. Therefore, either S
x
A + cw or S
x
A − cw results in
a better payoff for player A than SxA for M
x
A contradicting the optimality of S
x
A. Therefore the sum of
the entries of w is not 0.
We can then let the sum of the entries of w be equal to 1. Then
wT (1−MTA ) = (1, . . . , 1).
We will return to w momentarily. We can compute that MxB = 1 −MTA + xB. Since SxA is a Nash
equilibrium,
(SxA)
T ·MxB = (v, . . . , v)
(SxA)
T · (1−MA(`)T ) + x(SxA)TB − (v, . . . , v) = 0
(SxA)
T · (1−MA(`)T ) + (d+ x(`− 1)− v, d+ x(`− 2)− v, . . . , d− v) = 0
where d = x(SxA)
T · (0, 1, . . . , `− 1)T . Then we can substitute w into the equation:
x(`− 1, . . . , 1, 0) = −(SxA)T · (1−MA(`)T ) + (v − d)(1, . . . , 1)
= −(SxA)T · (1−MA(`)T ) + (v − d)wT (1−MA(`)T )
= (−(SxA)T + (v − d)wT )(1−MA(`)T ).
Let r0 = x(−(SxA)T + (v − d)wT ) and ri = r0 + xiwT so that:
ri(1−MA(`)T ) = x(`− 1 + i, . . . , 1 + i, i)
Let R be a `× ` matrix with rows r0, . . . , r`−1. Then
R(1−MA(`)T ) = xB.
Therefore through this seemingly arbitrary construction we obtain that
(I`×` +R)(1−MA(`)T ) = 1−MA(`)T + xB = MxB
which is invertible by Lemma 3.4. Thus, 1−MA(`)T is invertible.
The last several results have dealt with payoff matrices of restricted games. The payoff matrix of a
restricted game is, by definition, dependent on the length of a player’s optimal strategy. The following
lemma further demonstrates the relevance of the lengths of the players’ optimal strategies.
Lemma 3.7. If there exists `0 and x1 > x0 ≥ 0 such that for all x0 < x < x1, `(SA(Gxa,b)) = `0 then
lim
x→x0
SA(G
x
a,b)
exists and is an optimal strategy.
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Proof. Let Fa,b = G
x0
a,b. We will treat Fa,b as imprecise so the proof holds for both precise and imprecise
games. By Proposition 3.6, at least one of MA = MA(Fa,b | `0) and MB = MB(Fa,b | `0) is invertible.
Suppose MA is invertible. Then the limit
lim
x→0
SA(F
x
a,b) = lim
x→0
(MxA)
−11
1T (MxA)
−11
=
(MA)
−11
1T (MA)−11
= S
exists. As x goes to 0, SxA(Fa,b) is nonzero and has entry wise sum of 1. Thus, S is all nonnegative and
also has entry wise sum of 1. Finally,
vA = lim
x→0
vxA = lim
x→0
min(MxA · SxA) = min(MA · S)
Thus S is optimal. If MA is not invertible, then MB is invertible. By the Reverse Theorem, for all
x0 < x < x1, `(SB(G
x
a,b)) = `. Therefore, we can apply the same argument as above to S
x
B(Ga,b).
While the above lemma’s potential power is clear, we have not yet demonstrated that the conditions
it requires are met by any games. We need some restrictions on the length of optimal strategies as we
adjust chip value in order to effectively use the above results. The next lemma and its corollary give us
the necessary structure.
Lemma 3.8. Let player A have advantage. Let `0 = maxx∈R>0 `(S
x
A). The set of p such that `(S
p
A) = `0
is open in R>0.
Proof. The length of SxA is an integer and is bounded above by a. Hence `0 exists. Pick some p so that
`(SpA) = `o. Suppose there exists no , δ > 0 such that for all p
′ ∈ N,δ(p) = (p − , p + δ), we have
`(Sp
′
A ) = `0. Then we can define a sequence {xk} → p by xk ∈ N1/k,1/k(p) so that `(SxkA ) < `0. There
exist only a finite number of possible values for `(SxA) so there must be at least one `1 < `0 such that{xk}
has a convergent subsequence {xak} with `(S
xak
A ) = `1 for all k.
By Theorem 3.2,
lim
k→∞
M
xak
A (Ga,b | `1) = MpA(Ga,b | `1),
lim
k→∞
v
xak
A (Ga,b | `1) = vpA(Ga,b | `1).
Then
lim
k→∞
S
xak
A = lim
k→∞
((M
xak
A (`1))
−1 · (vxakA 1`1)) = (MpA(`1))−1 · (vpA1`1) = S
for which we have that
min(MpA · S) = lim
k→∞
min(M
xak
A · S
xak
A ) = lim
k→∞
vxkA = v
p
A
S is then an optimal strategy in Gpa,b. S is the limit of length `1 strategies so it has length at most `1.
Therefore S 6= SpA. The player with advantage has exactly one optimal strategy so an appropriate open
neighborhood must exist.
Lemma 3.9. Let `0 be as above and let MA be invertible. Also assume S
x
A is of constant-length on some
interval (a, b). Then there exists vectors S, T such that for all x ∈ (a, b),
SxA = S + xT.
Proof. Let
S =
M−1A 1
1TM−1A 1
.
Note that S is not necessarily optimal or even a valid strategy. It satisfies two notable properties. The
sum of the entries of S is 1 and MAS is a constant vector. Consider,
(MxA −MA)(SxA − S) = xB(SxA − S)
xB(SxA − S) is a constant vector as each row in B differs by a vector of all 1’s from the row above it. A
vector of all 1’s multiplied by SxA − S is 0 as both SxA and S have entrywise sum of 1. Let this constant
vector be denoted u. Then
(MxA −MA)(SxA − S) = u
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MxAS
x
A +MAS −MASxA −MxAS = u
MxAS
x
A +MAS −MASxA −MAS − xBS = u
Note the MAS terms cancel, and that M
x
AS
x
A is a constant vector. Thus, because u is also a constant
vector, we know that MAS
x
A + xBS is a constant vector, which we call v. Then
MAS
x
A + xBS = v
SxA = (MA)
−1(v − xBS)
Note that M−1A v is a scalar multiple of S. Let this scalar be c. We have the relation:
SxA = cS − xM−1A BS
We see that c is a function of x, and must be the unique scalar that causes cS − xM−1A BS to have
entrywise sum of 1. Thus c is given by:
a∑
i=0
(cS − xM−1A BS)i = 1
c
a∑
i=0
S = 1 + x
a∑
i=0
(M−1A BS)i
c = 1 + x
a∑
i=0
(M−1A BS)i∑a
i=0(M
−1
A BS) is a constant because MA, B, and S are. Let it be denoted r.
SxA = (1 + rx)S − xM−1A BS = S + x(rS −M−1A BS)
rS −M−1A BS is a vector independent of x. Let it be denoted by T . Thus,
SxA = S + xT
Thus, on an x-interval on which SxA is of constant length, S
x
A is given by S + xT . Further, each entry of
SxA is given by a linear equation Si + xTi.
Note that the above lemma does not make use of anything specific to player A or B. Thus, it also
applies to SxB if the necessary conditions hold.
Corollary 3.10. Let player A have advantage. Let `0 be as above. Then there exists x0 > 0 such that
for all 0 < x ≤ x0, `(SxA) = `0.
Proof. Let x ∈ R>0 be chosen such that `(SxA) = `0. By Proposition 3.6, at least one of MA and MB
is invertible. Suppose first that MA is invertible. By Lemma 3.8, there exists an open interval (a, b)
containing x on which SxA is constant-length. Let (a, b) be the largest such open interval. We are able
apply the above lemma. There exists vectors S, T such that for all x ∈ (a, b)
SxA = S + xT.
For x > 1, the value of a chip is greater than the value of winning the game so neither player will ever
bid more than 0. Thus, b ≤ 1. Suppose that a > 0. On this interval SxA is given by S + xT for some
S, T . Therefore, the (`0)-th entry of S
x
A is either strictly increasing, strictly decreasing, or constant. By
Lemma 3.7 and the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium strategies for the player with advantage.
lim
x→aS
x
A = S
a
A
lim
x→b
SxA = S
b
A
If SaA or S
b
A have length `0 then by Lemma 3.8 there is an open interval about a or b respectively on
which optimal strategies have length `0 so (a, b) is not maximal. Thus, both S
a
A and S
b
B must have length
less than `0. This implies that:
lim
x→a(S
x
A)`0−1 = 0 = Si + aTi
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lim
x→b
(SxA)`0−1 = 0 = Si + bTi
A linear equation has at most one zero unless Si and Ti are both 0. Si + xTi = (S
x
A)`0 6= 0 however so
this cannot be the case. Therefore a must be equal to 0. Then SxA is constant-length on some interval
which has 0 as an endpoint.
Now suppose that MB is invertible. We can perform the same operations on the optimal strategy
of minimal length SxB for player B and then apply the Reverse Theorem to achieve the same result for
player A.
Given this structure, we can complete our discussion of convergence.
Theorem 3.11. Let player A have advantage. Then
lim
x→0
SA(G
x
a,b) = SA(Ga,b)
exists and is optimal.
Proof. By Corollary 3.10, there exists x0 such that for all 0 < x ≤ x0, `(SxA) = `0. These are the
necessary conditions to apply Lemma 3.7 which gives the result.
4 Computing the Optimal Strategy
Although we have developed results on the structure of optimal bidding in all-pay bidding games, we
have yet to fully describe how these optimal strategies can be found. In this section, we put together
our results for precise games with our convergence results for imprecise games to give an algorithm to
calculate the optimal bidding strategy for any state in an all-pay bidding game.
4.1 Main Algorithm
In this section, we will discuss the algorithm we developed to quickly calculate an optimal strategy.
Our algorithm first assigns to each chip an arbitrarily small but positive value x. This adjusted game
is precise, so we will be able to take advantage of the structure we have shown for precise games. In
particular, we will be able to use Theorem 3.5, which gives a formula for the unique bidding strategy
belonging to the player with advantage, in terms of the payoff matrix and optimal length:
SA =
MA(Ga,b | `)−1 · 1
1T ·MA(Ga,b | `)−1 · 1
From the convergence results in the previous section, the resulting strategy will be able to approximate
an optimal strategy for player A in an imprecise game to any desired degree of accuracy. Note that this
strategy is not guaranteed to be a unique optimal strategy in the unadjusted game if the unadjusted
game is not precise. Once SA is known, we know by convergence that R(SA) will have to be an optimal
strategy for player B. (SA,R(SA)) is then within any desired degree of accuracy of a Nash equilibrium
for the unadjusted game.
For now we will assume the payoff matrix is known. Then, to implement Theorem 3.5 we just need
to invert the appropriate minor of that matrix, multiply by a vector of 1’s, and rescale so that the entries
of the resulting vector sum to 1. The problem now is to find this optimal length in a precise game where
the payoff matrix is given. The next two lemmas will allow us to use binary search to find the optimal
length quickly.
Lemma 4.1. Let the game be precise. Let 1k be a vector of all 1’s. Then for all 1 ≤ k ≤ `, MA(k)−1 ·1k
will have all nonnegative entries.
Proof. By similar reasoning as in Lemma 3.4, we know that MA(k)
−1 will be invertible for all k ≤ `. We
naturally consider the game Ga,b | k. Let SkA and SkB be A’s and B’s optimal strategies in this game.
Note that if k = `, then by definition of `, we have that MA(`) ·SA gives a constant (nonnegative) vector,
so MA(`)
−1 ·1 will be SA scaled by 1/vA. This will have all nonnegative entries because SA is a strategy.
We can extend this reasoning to when k < ` if we know that SkA still has length k, as it must also give
some constant payoff, vkA, in Ga,b | k.
Suppose SkA does not have length k. Then S
k
A has length m < k < `. Let v
k
A be the value of
Ga,b | k for player A. Suppose that vkA ≥ vA. Then, we can make strategy S′A for player A in Ga,b, by
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extending SkA to the full game, where (SA)i = (S
k
A)i if i ≤ m − 1, and is 0 otherwise. Then, note that
(MA · S′A)i = vkA ≥ vA if i ≤ m − 1. Because m < k, m ≤ k − 1 where k − 1 is the maximal number
of chips useable in the Ga,b | k game. Thus, if i = m, (MA · S′A)m ≥ vkA ≥ vA by definition of Nash
Equilibrium for Ga,b | k. This is A’s payoff against S′A if B purely bids m.
But since A’s maximal bid in S′ is m− 1, that means if B uses a pure strategy where she bids i > m
chips, she will just be winning the same bids by more chips, which cannot be better in any way. Thus,
(MA · S′A)i ≥ (MA · S′A)m ≥ vkA ≥ vA. Thus, for all 0 < i < ` − 1, (MA · S′A)i ≥ vA, so S′A is a Nash
Equilibrium for Ga,b as well. But S
′
A has length m < `, so it would have to be distinct from SA because
it has a different length. This cannot be the case as A’s optimal strategy is unique. Thus, we have a
contradiction and SkA cannot have length less than k.
Thus, SkA has length k, so by the same argument as the k = ` case, all the entries of MA(k)
−1 · 1 are
nonnegative. Note that because none of the above reasoning depended upon player A having advantage,
if vkA < vA, we can apply the above argument from player B’s perspective.
Lemma 4.2. Let the game be precise. Let 1k be a vector of all 1’s. Then for all k > `, either MA(k) is
not invertible or MA(k)
−1 · 1k will have all nonnegative entries.
Proof. Assume MA(k) is invertible.
We begin by showing there is no valid length (` + 1)-strategy for player A that produces the same
payoff for player B’s first ` + 1 pure strategies. Suppose there does exist such a strategy S. Let v be
the payoff that S produces against player B’s first `+ 1 pure strategies (pure bids from 0 up to `). Note
that because SA has length ` there is a Nash equilibrium strategy R(SA) of length ` for player B. We
consider three cases:
(1) v > vA
Since B bids at most `− 1, we only need to consider the first ` coordinates of MA ·SA and MA ·S.
By our assumption, v > vA so S is strictly better than SA against R(SA). Thus SA cannot be a
Nash Equilibrium strategy, which is a contradiction.
(2) v < vA
If v < vA then let player B use the strategy R(S). It is easy to verify that R(S) produces the
payoff 1 − v > 1 − va against player A’s first ` + 1 pure strategies. Thus, by similar reasoning as
in the previous case, R(S) is strictly better than R(SA) against SA, so R(SA) cannot be a Nash
Equilibrium strategy, which is a contradiction.
(3) v = vA
If S = (s0, . . . , s`, 0, . . . , 0)
T , then expanding the first ` + 1 coordinates of MA · S results in the
equations αis0 + · · · + αi+`s` = vA for i = 0, . . . ,−`. Considering the game from player B’s
perspective, note that R(S) gives B a payoff of 1 − vA against A’s first ` + 1 strategies. In
particular, B’s payoff against A bidding ` will be
(1− α`)s` + (1− α0)s0 = 1− (α`s` + · · ·+ α0s0) = 1− vA.
B’s payoff x against against A bidding `+ 1 will be
x = 1− (α`+1s` + α1s0).
Note that because player A is winning ties, α`+1 < α`, . . . , α1 < α0, as in each case A is winning
by one more chip. Thus, α`s` + · · ·+ α0s0 > α`+1s` + α1s0 which means
1− vA = 1− (α`s` + · · ·+ α0s0) ≤ 1− (α`+1s` + α1s0) = x.
Similarly, B’s payoff if A bids anything greater than k will be greater than 1−vA. Thus, R(S) is a
Nash equilibrium strategy of length k for player B. Note that if k is at least `+ 2, then R(S) will
have length at least `+ 2, which will be a contradiction if SA has length `. Since k > `, this means
we must have k = `+1. Then, R(S) is a Nash Equilibrium strategy of length `+1, so by Theorem
2.5 it must be of the form λ(s`−1, . . . , s0, 0, . . . , 0) + (1− λ)(0, s`−1, . . . , s0, 0, . . . , 0) for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
In turn, S must be of the form λ(0, s0, . . . , s`−1, 0, . . . , 0) + (1−λ)(s0, . . . , s`−1, 0, 0, . . . , 0). We can
now write MA(`+ 1) ·S = vA1`+1 as MA(`+ 1) ·λ(0, s0, . . . , s`−1) + (1−λ)(s0, . . . , s`−1, 0) = vA1,
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which can be expanded to the equation
λ

α1s0 + · · ·+ α`s`−1
α0s0 + · · ·+ α`−1s`−1
...
α−(`−1)s0 + · · ·+ α0s`−1
+ (1− λ)

α0s0 + · · ·+ α`−1s`−1
...
α−(`−1)s0 + · · ·+ α0s`−1
α−`s0 + · · ·+ α−1s`−1
 =

vA
vA
...
vA

By considering the first coordinate, we get the equation
λ(α1s0 + · · ·+ α`s`−1) + (1− λ)vA = vA
so we must have α1s0 + · · ·+ α`s`−1 = vA as well. Therefore,
α1s0 + · · ·+ α`s`−1 = α0s0 + · · ·+ α`−1s`−1.
But since the game is precise, there must be an inequality for all the coefficients: α1 < α0, . . . , α` <
α`−1, so
α1s0 + · · ·+ α`s`−1 < α0s0 + · · ·+ α`−1s`−1
because not all the si’s are 0. Thus, we have a contradiction, and k cannot be `+ 1 either.
Thus, no such strategy S can exist, so if MA(k) is invertible, MA(k)
−1 ·1k must have some negative
terms.
We can implement the binary search algorithm as follows. Let the lower bound, low, start as 1. Let
the upper bound, high, start as min(a, b) + 1.
Function LSearch(MA, low, high)
if low + 1 = high then
return low
else
k = (low + high)/2
if MA(k)
−1 · 1k is all nonnegative then
return LSearch(MA, k, high)
else
// MA(k) is not invertible or MA(k)
−1 · 1k has a negative entry
return LSearch(MA, low, k)
end
end
Algorithm 1: Binary Search For Length
By Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, this algorithm will return the length of the optimal strategy for player A.
We can then apply our formula to directly compute player A’s unique optimal strategy. The reverse of
this strategy is an optimal strategy for player B. This completes the algorithm. From our results on the
convergence of strategies, this algorithm is also able to approximate, with any desired degree of accuracy,
optimal strategies for imprecise games.
4.2 Recursion on Directed Graphs
So far, our results apply to the strategy for bidding on a single turn in an all-pay bidding game. This
assumes some prior knowledge of successor game states that allows the payoff matrix to be already
known. Thus, to use our algorithm to compute Nash equilibria for any all-pay bidding game state, we
need some way of first finding the payoff matrix. By noting that the payoff matrices for end states (where
one player has already won) can be set as 0 and 1 for win and loss, we use recursion from the end states
of the game to find the payoff matrix for an arbitrary turn.
Consider a combinatorial game G represented as a directed graph D = (V,E) with two vertices
marked as A and B and a token placed at some vertex of the graph. We can think of each vertex as the
starting position of a subgame of G. Thus for player A with a chips and player B with b chips, the token
on vertex w, we write the game as wa,b. Let S(w) give all the vertices that can be moved to from w.
We can compute vA as follows:
vA(wa,b) =
 1 if w = A0 if w = B
STB ·X · SA otherwise
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Then if A bids i and B bids j and A makes a move then A’s payoff will be
A(i, j) = max
w′∈SA(w)
vA(w
′
a−j+i,b−i+j)
because A will seek to maximize his probability of winning over all of his possible sucessor states. If A
bids i and B bids j and B makes a move then A’s payoff will be
B(i, j) = min
w′∈SB(w)
vA(w
′
a−j+i,b−i+j)
because B will seek to minimize A’s probability of winning over all of her possible sucessor states.
Therefore
Xi,j =
{
max (A(i, j), B(i, j)) if i < j or i = j and A has advantage
min (A(i, j), B(i, j)) if i > j or i = j and B has advantage
as each player will consider the best possible scenario if he moves and the worst possible scenario if
their opponent moves. Then SA, SB can computed from this payoff matrix X, using our algorithm from
before.
Note this allows us to recurse up the directed graph from states A and B, first with values for those
states, then values for the states one move away (i.e. v such that either A or B ∈ S(v)), then states two
moves away, and so on.
4.3 Complexity
An arbitary n × n matrix can be inverted in O(n3) time using the Gauss-Jordan method. There exist,
however, many more efficient algorithms specific to Toeplitz matrices. In particular, the Levinson-Trench-
Zohar algorithm can solve a Toeplitz system in O(n2) time [4].
For an n × n matrix, the binary search algorithm requires log(n) iterations. Each iteration requires
solving one Toeplitz system and scanning one vector for negative values. Thus, the algorithm runs in
time on the order of log(n) · (O(n2) + O(n)) = O(log(n)n2). Thus finding an optimal strategy and
corresponding payoff for a given payoff matrix requires time on the order of O(log(n)n2).
A simple implementation of our recursive algorithm would take time growing exponentially with the
depth of D. We can greatly speed up this process by storing each vA(i, j) that is computed. Then when
vA(i, j) must be computed again the value can be looked up rather than recomputed. In the worst case,
the program must compute vA for every possible combination of chips at every vertex. Because the sum
of the chips is constant, this requires at most (a + b) · |V | computations. Thus, the entire algorithm
runs in time on the order of O(|V | · log(n)n2) where n = a + b. For comparison, a linear programming
algorithm to achieve the same results would require time on the order of O(|V | · n3.5) [3].
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